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Abstract. In previous studies of spatial public goods game, each player is able to
establish a group. However, in real life, some players cannot successfully organize
groups for various reasons. In this paper, we propose a mechanism of reputation-driven
group formation, in which groups can only be organized by players whose reputation
reaches or exceeds a threshold. We define a player’s reputation as the frequency of
cooperation in the last T time steps. We find that the highest cooperation level can be
obtained when groups are only established by pure cooperators who always cooperate
in the last T time steps. Effects of the memory length T on cooperation are also
studied.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 87.23.Kg, 87.23.Ge
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1. Introduction
Cooperation is widely existent in human society and animal world [1]. Understanding
the emergence of cooperation among selfish individuals remains to be an interesting
problem. So far, evolutionary game theory has provided a powerful mathematical
framework to address this problem [2]. Researchers have proposed various game models,
among which the public goods game (PGG) has been a prevailing paradigm [3].
Due to the rapid development of complex networks [4], the PGG and other
evolutionary game models have been extensively studied in various kinds of structured
populations [5, 6, 7], including regular lattices [8, 9, 10, 11, 12], random graphs [13],
scale-free networks [14, 15, 16, 17] and dynamic networks [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23]. Network
structure helps cooperators survive through the formation of clusters. Within clusters,
cooperators can assist each other and benefits of mutual cooperation outweigh losses
against defector.
Apart from network reciprocity, a number of mechanisms have been discovered
that facilitate cooperation. Szabo´ and Hauert have studied the voluntary participation
and found that the presence of loners leads to a cyclic dominance of the
strategies [24]. Szolnoki and Szabo´ have found that inhomogeneous activity can promote
cooperation [25]. Perc and Szolnoki have shown that social diversity is an efficient
promoter of cooperation [26]. Szolnoki and Perc have considered that the collective
benefits of group membership can only be harvested if the fraction of cooperators within
the group, i.e., their criticalmass, exceeds a threshold value [27]. Perc and Wang have
found that heterogeneous aspirations promote cooperation [28]. Xia et. al. have revealed
the dynamic instability of cooperation due to diverse activity patterns [29]. Szolnoki
and Perc have found that conformity enhances network reciprocity in evolutionary social
dilemmas [30]. Chen and Szolnoki have found that individual wealth-based selection
supports cooperation in spatial public goods games [31].
In the spatial PGG, each group is composed of a focal player and all its nearest
neighbors. Thus, for a given network, the number of different PGG groups is equal to
the network size. In the previous studies, each PGG group is assumed to be existent
all the time and each player is always involved in several independent groups which
are determined by the interaction graph. However, in real life, not all groups can be
successfully organized and players are reluctant to participate in some groups for various
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reasons. Very recently, Szolnoki and Chen proposed a model where only those players
whose previous payoff exceeds a threshold level can establish a PGG group [32]. They
demonstrated that a carefully chosen threshold to establish PGG group could efficiently
improve the cooperation level.
Motivated by the pioneering work of Szolnoki and Chen, in this paper we propose
a reputation-driven group formation mechanism where PGG groups are organized by
players whose reputation reaches or exceeds a threshold. A player’s reputation is defined
as the frequency of cooperation in the past few time steps. We find that cooperation
can be greatly promoted when PGG groups are established by high-reputation players.
2. Model
Our model is described as follows.
Players are located on a L × L square lattice with periodic boundary conditions.
Each PGG group is composed of a focal player and its four neighbors. Thus the size
of each PGG group is five. A player i may participate in five different PGG groups
orginized by i and its four neighbors respectively.
At each time step, every cooperator contributes a unit cost to each involved PGG
group. Defectors invest nothing. The total cost of a group is multiplied by a factor,
and is then redistributed uniformly to all the five players in this group. We denote i’s
strategy at time t as si(t) = 1 for cooperation and si(t) = 0 for defection. At time t,
the payoff that player i gains from the group organized by player j is
Πji (t) = −si(t) +
r
5
4∑
x=0
sx(t), (1)
where x = 0 stands for player j, x > 0 represent the neighbors of j and r is the
multiplication factor. The total payoff of the player i at t is calculated by
Pi(t) =
∑
jǫΩi
∆j(t)Π
j
i (t), (2)
where Ωi denotes the community of neighbors of i and itself, ∆j(t) = 1 if player j’s
reputation Rj(t) reaches or exceeds a threshold H otherwise ∆j(t) = 0. The reputation
of a player i at time t is defined as the frequency of cooperation in the last T time steps,
that is
Ri(t) =
∑T
m=1 si(t−m)
T
. (3)
We set Ri(0) = 1 so that initially (t = 0) all players can organized PGG groups.
When the reputation threshold H = 0, our model is reverted to the original model
in which players can organized PGG groups all the time. Initially, cooperators and
defectors are randomly distributed with the equal probability 0.5. After each time
step, all individuals synchronously update their strategies as follows. Each individual i
randomly chooses a neighbor j and adopts the neighbor j’s strategy with the probability:
W [si(t+ 1)← sj(t)] =
1
1 + e[(Pi(t)−Pj(t)]/K
, (4)
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Figure 1. (Color online) The fraction of cooperators ρc as a function of the
multiplication factor r for different values of the reputation threshold H . The memory
length T is 2, 3, 5 for (a), (b), (c) respectively. For each value of T , ρc reaches the
highest when H = 1, indicating that cooperation is best promoted when PGG groups
can only be organized by pure cooperators who always cooperate in the last T time
steps.
where K characterizes the noise introduced to permit irrational choices [33].
3. Main results and Analysis
We assume that players occupy nodes on a 100×100 square lattice and the noiseK = 0.5.
Players can be divided into four types: Cs (Ds) denotes cooperators (defectors) who
successfully organize PGG groups, and Cf (Df ) denotes cooperators (defectors) who fail
to organize PGG groups. The key quantity for characterizing the cooperative behavior
of the system is the fraction of cooperators (including Cs and Cf) ρc in the steady state.
In all simulations below, ρc is obtained by averaging over the last 5,000 time steps
of the entire 50,000 time steps. Each data is obtained by averaging over 50 different
realizations.
Figure 1 shows the fraction of cooperators ρc as a function of the multiplication
factor r for different values of the reputation threshold H . From Fig. 1, we can see that
for any given value of H , ρc increases from 0 to 1 as r increases. In Fig. 2, we plot
the full r − H phase diagram for the memory length T = 5. There are regions: full
cooperators (C), full defectors (D), and the coexistence of cooperators and defectors
(C + D). One can find that the region of C + D phase becomes very narrow as the
reputation threshold H increases. This phenomenon indicates that the phase transition
from full D to the coexistence of C +D is discontinuous when H and T is very large.
Figure 3 shows the fraction of cooperators ρc as a function of the reputation
threshold H for different values of the memory length T when the multiplication factor
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Figure 2. (Color online) Full r − H phase diagram for the memory length T = 5.
There are three phases: full cooperators (C), full defectors (D), and the coexistence
of cooperators and defectors (C + D). As H increases, the region for C + D phase
becomes narrower.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
c
H
 T = 2
 T = 5
 T = 10
Figure 3. (Color online) The fraction of cooperators ρc as a function of the reputation
threshold H for different values of the memory length T . The multiplication factor
r = 3. For each value of T , ρc increases with H .
r = 3. For fixed values of the multiplication factor r and the memory length T , ρc
increases with H , indicating that cooperation is best promoted when PGG groups can
only be organized by pure cooperators who always cooperate in the last T time steps.
Since some groups may not be organized, it is necessary for us to investigate whether
higher cooperation level brings higher payoff. Figure 4 shows the average payoff of
players 〈P 〉 in the steady state as a function of the reputation threshold H for different
values of the multiplication factor r. One can see that for each value of r, 〈P 〉 increases
with H , manifesting that the average payoff is positively related with the cooperation
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Figure 4. (Color online) The average payoff of players 〈P 〉 in the steady state as a
function of the reputation threshold H for different values of the multiplication factor
r. The memory length T = 10. For each value of r, 〈P 〉 increases with H .
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Figure 5. (Color online) Snapshots of typical distributions of four types of players at
different time steps t when the reputation threshold H = 0.6, the multiplication factor
r = 3.5 and the memory length T = 5. Successful cooperators (Cs) are marked by
blue, whereas failed cooperators (Cf ) are denoted by green. Successful defectors (Ds)
are marked by red and failed defectors (Df ) are denoted by gray. The time step is t=
5, 15, 25 and 50 for (a)-(d) respectively. In the case of high threshold value, Cf players
form a protective layer around Cs clusters, which reduces payoffs of external defectors.
level in our model.
To intuitively understand the mechanism of cooperation enhancement through
reputation-driven group formation, we plot the spatial distribution of players at different
time steps for the reputation threshold H = 0.6 [see Fig. 5] and H = 0.2 [see Fig. 6]
respectively.
For the high threshold value (e.g., H = 0.6), most of players become Df players
in the early evolution [see Fig. 5(a)]. As time evolves, Cs players form some compact
clusters [see Fig. 5(b)] and Cs clusters continually expand [see Figs. 5(c) and (d)].
Finally, Cs players occupy the whole system (results are not shown here). Because of
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Figure 6. (Color online) Snapshots of typical distributions of four types of players at
different time steps t when the reputation threshold H = 0.2, the multiplication factor
r = 3.5 and the memory length T = 5. Successful cooperators (Cs) are marked by
blue, whereas failed cooperators (Cf ) are denoted by green. Successful defectors (Ds)
are marked by red and failed defectors (Df ) are denoted by gray. The time step is
t= 5, 25, 100 and 1000 for (a)-(d) respectively. In the case of low threshold value, Cs
clusters are surrounded by Ds and Df clusters.
the high reputation threshold, only a very small fraction of Ds players can dispersedly
survive during the whole evolution. It is noted that during the evolution, Cs clusters
are surrounded by Cf players. These Cf players act as protective layers which can
effectively prevent the invasion of defectors. On the one hand, defectors outside the
protective layers cannot gain payoffs from Cf players who fail to organize PGG groups.
One the other hand, Cf players can receive aid from Cs players inside the protective
layers by participating in PGG groups organized by Cs players.
For the low reputation threshold (e.g., H = 0.2), in the beginning most of players
become Ds or Df players while Cs players can only form tiny clusters [see Fig. 6(a)].
As time evolves, Cs clusters expand [see Fig. 6(b)]. After a long time, Cs clusters stop
expanding and are surrounded by the three other types of players [see Figs. 6(c) and
(d)]. For the low reputation threshold, Cf players cannot form protective layers around
Cs clusters and Cs players are exploit by the surrounding defectors. Thus, it becomes
difficult to reach the full cooperation in the case of low reputation threshold.
Next, we study the stationary density of the four types of players as a function of
the multiplication factor r for H = 0.2 and H = 0.6 respectively. From Fig. 7, one can
see that the stationary density of Df players decreases as r increases. On the contrary,
the stationary density of Cs players increases with r. Both of the stationary density of
Cf and Ds players are not a monotonic function of r. In fact, the stationary density
of Cf and Ds players are maximized at moderate values of r. For the low reputation
threshold (H = 0.2), the number of Ds players is much larger than that of Cf players
[see Fig. 7(a)]. For the high reputation threshold (H = 0.6), the number of Ds players
is almost the same as that of Cf players [see Fig. 7(b)].
Finally, we study the effects of the memory length T on cooperation. Figure 8 shows
the fraction of cooperators ρc as a function of the multiplication factor r for different
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Figure 7. Stationary density of the four types of players as a function of the
multiplication factor r for (a) H = 0.2 and (b) H = 0.6. The memory length T = 5. Cs
(Ds) denotes cooperators (defectors) who successfully organize PGG groups, and Cf
(Df ) denotes cooperators (defectors) who fail to organize PGG groups. The stationary
density of Cs (Df ) players increases (decreases) as r increases. The stationary density
of Cf and Ds players are maximized at moderate values of r.
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Figure 8. (Color online) The fraction of cooperators ρc as a function of the
multiplication factor r for different values of the memory length T . The reputation
threshold H is 0.2, 0.6, 1 for (a), (b), (c) respectively. For fixed values of H and
r, the highest cooperation level can be reached at an optimal value of T (hereafter
denoted by Topt). For H = 0.2, Topt = 1 [see Fig. 8(a)]. For H = 0.6, Topt = 2 [see
Fig. 8(b)]. For H = 1, the cooperation level increases as T increases, indicating that
Topt = ∞ [see Fig. 8(c)]. The value of Topt can be determined by the following rule.
For i/(i + 1) < H ≤ (i + 1)/(i + 2), Topt = i + 1 (i=0,1,2...). Note that for a given
value of H and the corresponding Topt, only pure cooperators who always cooperate
in the last Topt time steps can organized PGG groups.
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values of the memory length T . From Fig. 8(a), we can see that for a given value of
r, ρc decreases as T increases when the reputation threshold H = 0.2. However, for
H = 1, the cooperation level increases with T [see Fig. 8(c)]. For H = 0.6, the highest
cooperation level is obtained when T = 2 [see Fig. 8(b)]. In fact, we can determine
the optimal value of T which leads to the highest cooperation level as follows. For
i/(i + 1) < H ≤ (i + 1)/(i + 2) (i=0,1,2...), the optimal value of T (hereafter denoted
by Topt) is Topt = i+ 1. For examples, Topt = 2 when 1/2 < H ≤ 2/3 and Topt = 3 when
2/3 < H ≤ 3/4 (the results for Topt = 3 are not shown here). Note that for a given
value of H and the corresponding Topt, only pure cooperators who always cooperate in
the last Topt time steps can organized PGG groups. Taking H = 0.6 as an example,
defectors with reputation R = 2/3 still can organize groups if T = 3. However, for
T = 1 or T = 2, only pure cooperators who always cooperate in the last T time steps
can organized groups. According to the results in Fig. 1, cooperation can be best
enhanced if PGG groups can only be organized by pure cooperators. The criteria of
pure cooperators becomes stricter as the memory length T increases. Thus, the highest
cooperation level is obtained when T = 2.
4. Conclusions
In conclusion, we have studied the impact of reputation-driven group formation on the
evolution of cooperation. We define the reputation of a player as the frequency of
cooperation in the last T time steps. Here T represents a memory length. A player
can organize a group only when his/her reputation reaches or exceeds a threshold H .
We find that both of the cooperation level and the average payoff increase with the
threshold H , manifesting that cooperation can be best promoted when groups are only
organized by pure cooperators who never change strategy during the memory length.
For the high threshold H , failed cooperators who cannot successfully organize groups
form a protective layer around those successful cooperators. The dependence of the
memory length on cooperation is found to be non-monotonic.
Our results are useful for understanding the role of reputation in modern society.
Leaders who want to organize a group should be of high reputation. Low reputation will
destroy the stability of a group, leading to a lower cooperation level. Since individuals
with high reputation usually gain high payoff, our results are consistent with that in
Ref. [32]. The full-cooperator state disappears if the threshold level of payoff is too
high in Ref. [32]. While in our model, the full-cooperator phase still exists when the
reputation threshold is very high. Together Ref. [32] and our work provide a deeper
understanding of the impact of group formation on the evolution of cooperation.
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